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Conceptual Evaluation
Epistemic
Alejandro Pérez Carballo
My topic here is the question of conceptual evaluation along an epistemic dimension.
My question is: what makes for good concepts, epistemically?
Thus formulated, this question cries out for clariﬁcation in a number of ways. And
I will turn to that in due course. But it will help to get some sense of where we’re
going before getting started.
The distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic evaluations of belief is not
only familiar, but rather intuitive. In part, I suppose, that is because we have a
reasonable grasp of ways of evaluating beliefs—in terms of their truth, or their
warrant—that are plausibly classiﬁed as ‘epistemic’. There is no similar, pre-
theoretically available way of evaluating concepts that is uncontroversially classiﬁed
as epistemic. Still, it seems uncontroversial that scientiﬁc progress often involves
introducing new conceptual tools. And this suggests that scientiﬁc progress some-
times involves conceptual progress—that better science incorporates better concepts.
What could make some concepts epistemically better than others? On what is
perhaps the orthodox answer to this question—the answer that most philosophers
I have encountered are inclined to give, once they get past their reluctance to take talk
of concepts at face value without some heated preliminary discussion—the issue
turns on what properties correspond to the concepts in question. A concept is better
than another, epistemically, if and to the extent that the property corresponding to
one is ‘more natural’ than the one corresponding to the other. This line is often
accompanied by a quick reference to Goodman—‘you mean like how “blue” is a
better concept than “grue”?’—or to some discussion of natural kinds.
My proximate aim in this chapter is to argue that this answer cannot be right.
More generally, I want to argue against a particular way of addressing this question—
an approach that leans heavily on metaphysical, non-epistemic notions like ‘struc-
ture’ or ‘naturalness’. But the ultimate goal is to make some progress in clarifying
what a theory of conceptual evaluation should hope to accomplish.
As it happens, I am skeptical that there is a theoretically useful, non-epistemic
notion of ‘naturalness’ or ‘structure’ out there. But here I will simply take for granted
that the relevant metaphysical notions are in good order. In short, I want to grant for
the purposes of this chapter that there is a theoretically useful notion of ‘naturalness’
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according to which some properties are natural and some are not—or better yet, that
some properties are more natural than others. (I will assume, however, that the
relevant notion of ‘naturalness’ is either a primitive notion or can be deﬁned in purely
non-epistemic terms.) My claim will be that there is no straightforward connection
between a theory of epistemic evaluation of concepts and a theory of ‘natural’
properties thus understood.
1 Preliminaries
A number of authors have recently made explicit claims in what we can call ‘applied
conceptual ethics’:¹ claims to the effect that some concept is better—in some sense or
other—than another. Sally Haslanger, to take a well-known example, has defended a
number of theses about “howwemight usefully revise [our concepts of race and gender]
for certain political and theoretical purposes” (Haslanger 2000: 34). On her view, there
are legitimate purposes that will be better served by our using ‘woman’ so that (very
roughly) x is a woman conceptually entails x is subordinated (along some dimension or
other) (p. 39ff). Similarly, Kevin Scharp has argued that we should ‘replace’ our concept
of truth with two concepts which, together, are better than our (allegedly inconsistent)
ordinary concept for the purposes of ‘serious theorizing’ (Scharp 2013: 134).
These are not isolated cases, mind you. Peppered throughout the literature on the
so-called species problem² in philosophy of biology one often ﬁnds claims to the
effect that a particular species concept is better than another for certain theoretical
purposes.³And one only needs to look back at different applications of the Carnapian
method of explication to see that evaluative claims about concepts and vocabularies
are a fairly common occurrence in contemporary philosophy.⁴
Often, as in the examples above, such comparative claims are relativized to speciﬁc
purposes. The presumption then is that a concept cannot be good or bad simpliciter.
But this is by no means the only game in town. Ingo Brigandt, for example, has
argued that many concepts should be understood as having a built-in epistemic goal,
which “consists of those theoretical, explanatory, or investigative aims that are
pursued by this concept’s use” (Brigandt 2010: 36). For example, according to
Brigandt, the explanation of patterns of inheritance is an epistemic goal constitutive
of the classical gene concept—the gene concept associated with Mendel’s work and to
the research program led by Thomas Hunt Morgan (Morgan et al. 1915). Note that
the claim here is not just that the concept was introduced in order to predict
inheritance patterns. Rather, the claim is that a concept that is not put to use for
the purposes of predicting inheritance patterns would not be the classical gene
concept of Mendelian genetics.⁵ If Brigandt is right—and here I do not take a
¹ The terminology here is borrowed from A. Burgess and Plunkett (2013a).
² Kitcher (1984); Mayr (1996); Ereshefsky (2008); inter alia.
³ See, for example, Franklin-Hall (2007) and references therein.
⁴ For a more systematic overview of some of the relevant literature, see A. Burgess and Plunkett (2013a,b).
For illuminating discussion of Carnap’s ideal of explication and its relation to some of the work on the species
problem in philosophy of biology, see Kitcher (2008).
⁵ This at least is suggested by some of his remarks. For example, Brigandt (2010: 36): “each theoretical
concept, at least each central biological concept, consists of three components of content: (1) the concept’s
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stand on that—then one can make sense of a non-instrumental way of evaluating
concepts: we can evaluate how good a concept is relative to its constitutive epistemic
goal.⁶
In this chapter, however, I do not aim to advance or take issue with speciﬁc claims
about which concepts are better than others. Nor do I wish to discuss whether
conceptual evaluation must always take place against the backdrop of a speciﬁc
purpose. My concern, rather, is with an explanatory question that, as far as I can
tell, has received little attention in the literature.⁷ In brief, the question is: what
makes for good concepts, epistemically? But let me say something about each of the
key terms that ﬁgure in it, to get a better sense of what an answer to our question
will look like.
1.1 ‘Makes’
Take any speciﬁc claim about some concept being better than another (whether or
not better than is relativized to a speciﬁc purpose). To a ﬁrst approximation, the
question I’m interested in takes the following form: in virtue of what is the one better
than the other? Or: what is it because of which one is better than the other?⁸
Now, it might appear as if the answer to this question is straightforward, at least if
we are interested in comparisons among concepts relative to a speciﬁc purpose. For if
what we want is to explain why a concept is better than another relative to a given
purpose, the answer should be because the one is a better means to achieving said
purpose than the other. In other words, if conceptual evaluation is always relative to a
goal or purpose—whether or not that goal is constitutive of the relevant concepts—it
is merely a matter of instrumental evaluation. And what explains how good some-
thing is relative to a given purpose is just that it contributes, in the right sort of way,
to that purpose.
True, on this way of thinking there would still be room for disagreement as to what
‘the right sort of way’ is. Should we think that what makes a concept better than
another for a given purpose is that using the one is more likely to causally bring about
reference, (2) its inferential role, and (3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use”. See also the
discussion in Brigandt (2003), where he argues that different branches of biology are best understood as
having different homology concepts, partly because the homology concepts used in different branches are
put to distinct theoretical uses.
⁶ See Thomasson (Chapter 21, this volume) for an alternative take on this strategy—if concepts have
constitutive functions, one can evaluate concepts in terms of how well they serve the relevant functions.
⁷ Admittedly, it is not entirely clear whether the explanatory question I will be interested in is entirely
neutral on the more ‘ﬁrst-order’ questions about which concepts are better than others. The analogous
question about the relationship between meta-ethics and normative ethics has been the subject of some
interesting discussion recently (see, e.g., Enoch 2011; Fantl 2006). I do not know what the outcome of that
debate will be. But I expect whatever considerations bear against (or in favor) the claim that our answers to
ﬁrst-order normative questions can be constrained by answers to questions in metaethics can also be
brought to bear on the question whether the explanatory question about conceptual evaluation puts any
constraints on the ﬁrst-order debate. That said, I expect that, whether or not these projects constrain one
another, many ﬁrst-order claims about some concept being better than another will be compatible with
different answers to the explanatory question I will be interested in.
⁸ Cf. Fine (2012); Rosen (2010). For illuminating discussion of the role of such because claims in
normative theory and their relationship to the more ‘metaphysical’ discussion of grounding and the in
virtue of relation, see Berker (2018).
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the achievement of that purpose than using the other one? Or should we instead
think of the relevant notion of contribution in non-causal terms?
But it would be a mistake to think that in relying on a given purpose in order to
compare different concepts we are thereby presupposing some type of teleological
story of what makes a concept better than another. After all, one could think of the
relevant purposes as determining a particular dimension of evaluation, rather than a
goal or something to be promoted. This would leave it open whether the relevant
purposes are being used to pick out the particular ranking of concepts or whether
they are doing something more—for example, whether they are part of what explains
why the concepts are ranked in that particular way.⁹
This becomes especially apparent when we focus, as I will, on questions about
conceptual evaluation for theoretical purposes. I would be surprised if authors writing
about a concept being better than another for theoretical purposes were resistant to
being paraphrased as writing about evaluation of concepts from an epistemic per-
spective. And we can clearly make sense of the possibility of evaluating beliefs, say,
from an epistemic perspective without taking on a consequentialist or teleological
view on epistemic rationality.
Our question—what makes for good concepts, epistemically—can then be refor-
mulated as: what is it in virtue of which some concepts are epistemically better than
others? Or: what explains why some concepts are better than others, epistemically?
1.2 ‘Concepts’
It should not surprise you that philosophers can mean very different things by
‘concept’. And it should surprise you even less that cognitive scientists and philo-
sophers also use the term in importantly different ways—the former use it to refer to
so-called mental representations, the latter (often) to mean what gives such repre-
sentations their representational import.¹⁰ It is hard to expect much agreement, then,
on questions of conceptual evaluation unless we specify at the outset what we’re
taking concepts to be.¹¹
Now I have said little about what I take concepts to be. This is by design—I intend
to remain as neutral as I can on the nature of concepts. The terrain surrounding these
issues is slippery: one cannot enter it without getting entangled with questions about
modularity, the ‘grain’ of content, and so on.¹² Still, I cannot avoid making some
assumptions about what concepts are. My hope is that the assumptions I will make
are rather uncontroversial. Fortunately, as we will see, for the purposes of this chapter
⁹ Here, it is helpful to make an analogy with the debate over whether all moral theories admit of a
‘consequentialist’ counterpart. One could grant that any deontological theory can be formulated as a
version of consequentialism without thinking that the consequences of a given action play a role in
explaining why it has the moral properties that it does. See Portmore (2009) and references therein. Cf.
also the discussion in Hammond (1988); Stalnaker (2002).
¹⁰ See the Introduction to Margolis and Laurence (1999) for a guided tour of the issues.
¹¹ Things would be far worse, I suspect, if our interest were in questions of conceptual engineering: of
creating and changing concepts. For those questions, it is hard to see how to make much progress without
substantive assumptions about what concepts are. After all, on some views (e.g. Fodor 1975), changing a
concept is entirely out of the question. Here, however, I will have nothing to say about conceptual change—
my focus will be exclusively on conceptual evaluation.
¹² For a helpful overview, see Margolis and Laurence (2014).
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it will turn out not to matter how we answer many of the questions about the nature
of concepts.
First, I will be assuming that concepts are the sorts of things that words mean. This
need not imply, of course, that every concept corresponds to the meaning of some
word in English, nor that the meaning of every word in English is given by a concept.
But I intend talk of concepts to be substitutable throughout with talk of meanings, so
that, for example, talking about the epistemic merits of the concept species¹³ is
tantamount to talking about the epistemic merits of what the word ‘species’ means.
Second, and partly as a consequence of our ﬁrst assumption, I will presuppose that
concepts are not mental representations but rather what would give such putative
representations their representational import. In talking about concepts, then, I need
not presuppose anything like the Language of Thought Hypothesis: as long as it
makes sense to talk about the meaning of a word, everything I will say is neutral on
questions about cognitive architecture. Third, I will assume that concepts have non-
trivial representational content, and that the epistemic merits of a given concept are
at least in part determined by their representational content. I am thus ruling out for
present purposes views on which, for example, some of our ‘predicative’ concepts do
not correspond to a property (except perhaps in a pleonastic sense), at least if the
properties in question are supposed to do any explanatory work.¹⁴
1.3 ‘Good, Epistemically’
I’m interested in a particular type of evaluation of concepts, what I’ve been calling
epistemic evaluation. I want to say a bit more about what I have in mind by that.
I think we can get a handle on what epistemic evaluation of concepts amounts to
by taking seriously the idea that better science by and large incorporates better
concepts. The hope is that any grip we have on the notion of epistemically better
science will allow us to get a handle on a way of evaluating concepts that is
uncontroversially epistemic in nature. For our purposes, then, a broadly consequen-
tialist strategy will sufﬁce. I will assume that concepts that are conducive to achieving
what are clearly epistemic aims and purposes are better, epistemically, than those that
are not.
What are the relevant goals and purposes? I want to leave that open. I will only
assume that our epistemic goals include forming theories that have the familiar
theoretical virtues: accuracy, explanatoriness, fruitfulness, etc. How exactly each of
these should be cashed out is a good question, but one I will set aside for present
purposes.
At any rate, remember that my question is not: which are the good concepts,
epistemically? Here I will take for granted that we have a reasonably good sense of
¹³ Throughout, I will use italics to name concepts, relying on context to disambiguate from other uses.
I reserve the use of small caps for labeling theses, like  below.
¹⁴ I have in mind expressivist or non-cognitivist treatments of many ‘predicative’ concepts (views like
those in Gibbard 1990; Blackburn 1998; Yalcin 2011; Pérez Carballo 2016; among others). Presupposing
these views away only makes my work here harder: after all, if we hoped for a uniﬁed theory of conceptual
evaluation, and some concepts that should fall under the scope of such a theory cannot be understood as
determining or corresponding to a property, it would be a mistake to build our theory of conceptual
evaluation on facts about the corresponding properties.
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which concepts best help us achieve our epistemic goals. My question is rather: what
is it about those concepts that makes them good concepts, epistemically? What, in
other words, is it that explains the fact that they are the most conducive to our
achieving our epistemic goals? (What is it in virtue of which good concepts are good?)
2 The Simple Hypothesis
What I will call the simple hypothesis is perhaps the ﬁrst answer to our question that
comes to mind. The hypothesis starts out with a metaphor. The rough idea is that
some properties, unlike others, correspond to true ‘joints’ of nature. This can be
motivated in more than one way, but here is one that is relatively easy to state.
Suppose you think that for any set of things—including mere possibilia, if you
like—there is a property corresponding to that set: elements of the set are exactly
those things that instantiate the relevant property. (You might think that properties
just are such sets, but you need not.) Then you will have to agree that any two
things—really, any two things—have uncountably many properties in common, and
thus (or so it seems) are as alike to one another as any two other things. (A few
missing premises are left implicit in the preceding—not because they are unimpeach-
able, but because I do not intend to argue that the solution to this problem I sketch
below is the only way out.) And that, we can agree, would be madness: staplers and
raccoons, to pick just one pair, have little in common, or at any rate much less in
common with one another than two peas in a pod.
As is well known, you can avoid this conclusion if you insist that, among the
uncountably many ways of grouping things together, a relatively small class of them
has special status—and correspondingly, a small class of properties has special status.
It is the sharing of one or more of those properties that makes for genuine similarity.
Peas in a pod share many more of those special-status properties—and are thus much
more like one another—than a stapler and a raccoon do.
The idea of a metaphysical distinction among properties—‘natural/non-natural’,
‘sparse/abundant’, ‘joint-carving/gerrymandered’, and so on—can be ﬂeshed out in
multiple ways.¹⁵ But at this point we have enough materials to formulate a schematic
version of the simple hypothesis (I will use ‘elite’ as a stand-in for any one of ‘natural’,
‘sparse’, ‘joint-carving’ and so on):
 ( ): Concepts are better, epistemically, because and to the
extent that they correspond to elite properties.
Again, it is worth highlighting the fact that the notion of ‘eliteness’ is supposed to be
non-epistemic in nature.¹⁶
¹⁵ Armstrong (1978); Lewis (1983); Schaffer (2004); Sider (2013), See also Dorr and Hawthorne (2013)
and references therein.
¹⁶ The claim thus is not merely that what makes concepts better than others, epistemically, is a purely
‘objective’ matter. (Exactly what this means is a good question, but glossing it with the familiar cluster of
metaphors will have to do for now. Cf. Rosen 1994.) Rather, the presumption is that the notion of ‘eliteness’
is, in a sense that would need to be made precise, a purely metaphysical one.
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This simple hypothesis has at least two considerable virtues (beyond simplicity,
that is). First, it seems to get something right about our pretheoretic judgments about
the comparative merits of some concepts. Intuitively, there is something epistemic-
ally better about our concept green over the concept grue. And it certainly seems as if
this is due to the fact that whereas all green things genuinely have something in
common, not all grue things do. Second, the simple hypothesis offers a reduction of
one vexed question—which concepts are epistemically better?—to a question which,
if no less vexed, is at least supposed to be independently pressing. We need, the story
goes, the elite/non-elite distinction for other purposes—for giving an account of Laws
of Nature and for giving a theory of intentionality, to name a few. It would be
beautifully economical if we could also appeal to it in order to give an account of
conceptual evaluation.
Of course, the simple hypothesis, as stated, cannot be right. The notion we are after
is a comparative notion—that of a concept being epistemically better than another.
And as long as we think, as I think we must, that not all good concepts are equally
good, we will want to make ﬁner distinctions than those afforded by a binary
elite/non-elite distinction.
On the face of it, this is not an insurmountable obstacle. For one might in principle
deﬁne a suitable relative of ‘eliteness’ that is comparative in nature. This would
essentially involve specifying a ‘more elite than’ relation that applies to properties,
and replacing  ( ) with:
: A concept is epistemically better than another if and because the property
corresponding to the former is more elite than the one corresponding to the latter.
(Again, on this picture, the ‘more elite than’ notion would need to be speciﬁed in
purely non-epistemic terms. The goal, recall, is to reduce the question of epistemic
evaluation of concepts to questions about the purely metaphysical merits of the
corresponding properties.)
But already at this level of abstraction, we run into difﬁculties.¹⁷ The ﬁrst and most
straightforward one is this. Elite properties, we are sometimes told, make up a
minimal supervenience base for all facts.¹⁸ As a result, high-level properties will
not be elite properties. Now, this need not mean that all high-level concepts are
equally bad. The ‘more elite than’ relation should presumably make distinctions
among non-elite properties. But it does mean that the concepts of fundamental
physics are epistemically better than the concepts of, say, psychology. And while
¹⁷ Admittedly, many of the problems I will ﬂag in the remainder of this section arise because of the
decidedly Lewisian understanding of eliteness I am working with. An alternative gloss on the relevant
notions—one that takes seriously the lessons from Fodor (1974) (see also Antony 2003: esp. p. 12f)—would
allow for perfectly elite properties not only at the most fundamental level (say, the level of fundamental
physics), but also at the level of chemistry, biology, etc. Cf. Schaffer (2004), and what he labels the ‘scientiﬁc
conception’ of elite properties: “On the scientiﬁc conception, the properties invoked by total science are
ontologically on par. All carve out joints of nature. Muons, molecules, minds, and mountains are in every
sense equally basic” (p. 94). Ultimately, I will grant the proponent of  that there is some conception
of eliteness that is in reasonably good order, so I will set aside views like Fodor’s for the sake of brevity. As
should become clear, my arguments in }3 apply equally to both a Lewisian and a Fodorian view of eliteness.
¹⁸ See, for example, Lewis (1984, 1983). For an argument to the contrary, see Eddon (2013). Cf. also
Dorr and Hawthorne (2013: 10–13).
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one might be willing to grant that there are some—or even many—epistemic
dimensions along which the concepts of fundamental physics are epistemically better
than those of psychology, it is hard to believe that there is no epistemic dimension
along which psychological concepts are not worse than those of fundamental physics.
The second, related difﬁculty is a bit less straightforward, for it can only be
formulated against particular assumptions about the ﬁne structure of the ‘more
elite than’ relation. At a very abstract level, the worry is that even if we grant that
concepts corresponding to perfectly elite properties are better than the rest, it isn’t
clear that a plausible way of deﬁning ‘more elite than’ for non-elite properties will
mesh with reasonable assumptions about the relative merits of high-level concepts.
It is easier to see this with a speciﬁc proposal for how to understand the ‘more elite
than’ relation. Suppose that we think, as some do, that a property is more elite than
another iff its simplest deﬁnition in terms of fundamental properties is less complex
than the simplest deﬁnition of the other (for some suitable notion of simplicity).¹⁹
Consider now your favorite example of a concept of a multiply realizable property—
say, the concept of pain. Presumably, the corresponding property will admit of a
characterization as a disjunction, each of whose disjuncts corresponds to a way in
which the property could be realized. It follows now from our toy theory of ‘more
elite than’ that a concept for the property obtained by removing one or more
disjuncts from the initial property will be epistemically better than the initial concept.
So, the concept of pain-in-carbon-based-beings, for example, would turn out to be
epistemically better than the concept of pain. And this, surely, should cast doubt on
the current proposal.²⁰
Now, all of this might be avoided if instead of starting with a primitive elite/non-
elite distinction we start with a comparative notion speciﬁed in non-epistemic
terms.²¹ We could, for example, start with the assumption that there are objective
facts about genuine similarity—for example, the fact that a horse and a rhino are
more similar to one another than a raccoon and a stapler are to one another. And we
could use these in turn to get both an elite/non-elite distinction and a notion of ‘more
elite than’ which may well avoid some of the earlier difﬁculties.
For example, once we’re allowed access to facts about objective similarity, we can
deﬁne a ‘more elite than’ relation as follows: property F is more elite than G iff the most
dissimilar Fs are more similar to one another than the most dissimilar Gs.²² Perfectly
elite properties, on this view, would just be the properties that are maximally elite.²³
¹⁹ Lewis made something like this suggestion, in passing, in Lewis (1984: 228). For a discussion of some
of the difﬁculties involved in carrying this out in reasonable detail, see Sider (2013: section 7.11.1).
²⁰ A more subtle example, borrowed from Hall (2011): being methane is a much less useful concept,
epistemically, than being a saturated hydrocarbon, but the ‘canonical’ deﬁnition of the latter will be much
more complicated than the one of the former. Cf. Hall (2011: 21ff).
²¹ Or if, following some speculative remarks in Sider (2013), we also allow for primitives other than
‘elite’ in our deﬁnition of ‘more elite than’, for example, law-like.
²² Cf. Rosen (2015: 191).
²³ A notion of similarity could also be appealed to in giving a deﬁnition of eliteness directly, by letting
elite properties be convex, in the sense that whenever x and y are more like one another than y and z are,
then if x and z have property, so does y. Cf. Gärdenfors (2000: 70f), as well as Oddie (2005: 152ff). For
discussion of the issues arising from putative connections between naturalness and similarity, see Dorr and
Hawthorne (2013: 21–7).
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Still, to the extent that we think that, by and large, a property is more elite than
another iff it is more fundamental, we will be hard pressed to vindicate the thought
that, at least along some epistemic dimension, concepts from special sciences are
better for some purposes.
But let us suppose, for the sake of argument, that we can get an account of eliteness
that is not compromised from the outset. The question is whether we can build a
plausible theory of conceptual evaluation on top of it.
3 Against the Simple Hypothesis
I think  cannot be right. I want to rehearse a few arguments to that effect.
Ultimately, there are things a believer in  can say in response to each of them.
I will mention some of them. Thus I do not presume that any of the arguments here
are decisive. The hope rather is that all of them, together, can be taken as motivation
to seek an alternative story—one that might too be sensitive to the metaphysical
contours of our objects of inquiry, but which will not be determined by it.
3.1 Initial Skepticism
To a naive reader, the strategy behind  might not seem very promising. For it
seems eminently reasonable to insist that not all concepts can be said to correspond
to a property or relation.²⁴ Singular concepts, quantiﬁcational concepts, logical
concepts—to name a few—are not naturally construed as corresponding to some
property we could go on to evaluate for eliteness. And yet we would be giving up the
game if we were to rule out all such concepts as being candidates for conceptual
evaluation, or if instead we gave up on giving a uniﬁed theory of conceptual evaluation.
Yes, we cannot rule out the possibility of generalizing a theory of eliteness so that it
encompasses more than properties and relations.²⁵ But we should acknowledge—
pace Sider—the awkwardness of thinking that the epistemic beneﬁts afforded by the
logical vocabulary our best theories rely on is best explained by appealing to
comparisons between the metaphysical counterparts of (say) conjunction and the
Sheffer stroke.²⁶
None of this is to say that the burden is squarely on the side of  and its ilk.
But it might be enough to give us pause before embracing optimism about the
prospects of .
Another reason for being skeptical of the strategy recommended by  comes
from general considerations about the possibility of explaining normative phenom-
ena in purely non-normative terms.²⁷ The view that concepts corresponding to elite
properties are better epistemically than those corresponding to less elite ones gives
²⁴ Not that this cannot be done, in principle. For a sense of how such a story could go, see J. P. Burgess
(2005); Dasgupta (2009).
²⁵ See Sider (2013) for what is perhaps the most sophisticated attempt at doing that.
²⁶ Cf. Taylor (1993: 99): “Even granted that the physical world might come jointed, the notion that what
makes adding more natural than quadding is the prior jointedness of mathematical reality, rather than the
way we think about it, is peculiarly unappealing.”
²⁷ See Greco (2015) for a helpful discussion of the extent to which ‘open question’-style arguments carry
over to debates in meta-epistemology.
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rise to the question: why is it better, epistemically, to use concepts that correspond to
elite properties? And while there may well be an answer to that question that does not
implicitly rely on other normative or evaluative notions, I think it would not be
surprising if such an answer is not forthcoming.²⁸
Building a case against  on the basis of these two considerations would
require a fair amount of work.²⁹ But I do not intend to pursue that here. Rather,
I want to focus on a few additional considerations which, together, should at least call
into question the strategy recommended by .
3.2 Variety of Explanatory Purposes
Consider the following claim:
. All else equal, a concept is epistemically good to the extent that it
ﬁgures in good explanations.
Plausibly, this should be a consequence of any reasonable theory of conceptual
evaluation. Is it a consequence of ?
If ‘explanation’ in  is read as metaphysical explanation, then 
may seem to follow from , at least given certain reasonable assumptions.³⁰
Assume, ﬁrst, that metaphysical explanation is a transitive relation among facts. Next
assume that if x explains y, then x is more fundamental than y. Finally assume that x
is more fundamental than y to the extent that properties ‘involved’ in x are more elite
than those involved in y.³¹ Then we might be able to conclude that the more
explanations appeal to fact x the more elite the properties involved in x are.
This is still not quite what we want. At best we could conclude that the concepts
involved in good explanations are likely to correspond to more elite properties, and
thus (according to ) that they are likely to be good concepts. We could not yet
conclude that that all good concepts ﬁgure in some good explanations.³² But at least
something along these lines might work.
²⁸ Sider (2013) anticipates some of these concerns and claims without argument that aiming to have
‘joint-carving beliefs’ is “a constitutive aim of the practice of forming beliefs, as constitutive as the more
commonly recognized aim of truth” (p. 61). But as Hazlett (2017) points out, few if any of the arguments
that have been offered for the claim that truth is a ‘constitutive aim’ of belief carry over to support the claim
that having ‘joint-carving beliefs’ is a constitutive aim of (the practice of forming) belief(s).
²⁹ See Dasgupta (2018) for a careful attempt at carrying some of this out.
³⁰ What, on a metaphysical conception of explanation, makes for good explanations? That is an
excellent question, but one I have nothing to say about here.
³¹ This is at best merely a gesture in the right direction. For one, because the claim that a property is
involved in a fact needs to be cashed out in more detail—perhaps by assuming that facts are structured
entities. But more importantly, because most facts will presumably involve properties of different degrees
of eliteness, and we need an argument for thinking that x is more fundamental than y only if the least elite
property involved in x is more elite than the most elite one involved in y. After all, a no less plausible
hypothesis is that x is more fundamental than y only if the most elite property involved in x is more elite
than the most elite property involved in y. (Note too that things get much more complicated very quickly if
we allow for facts involving inﬁnitely many properties, or if we allow for the possibility that the ‘more elite
than’ relation is not a well-ordering.) Thanks here to Maya Eddon.
³² If we think of facts as comprising a structure partially ordered by ‘is more fundamental than’, we
could in principle have facts that are only ‘one-step’ above perfectly fundamental facts but on top of which
we will ﬁnd no other facts they explain. This would give rise to properties that are almost perfectly elite but
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We run into more signiﬁcant difﬁculties, though, once we recall that good explanations
are not explanations tout court, but rather explanations of something. For, pre-
sumably, not everything is equally in need of explanation.³³ To take a simple
example, consider the contrast between the following two events:
(1) Nancy, Tom, and William—three complete strangers—each win one of the
three prizes on the rafﬂe at the town fair.
(2) Alice, Barbara, and Carol—three sisters that came together to the fair—each
win one of the three prizes on the rafﬂe at the town fair.
The second of these two cries out for explanation in a way that the ﬁrst one does not.
And, plausibly, the more a fact cries out for explanation the more valuable an
explanation of that fact will be. So we should expect that good concepts will ﬁgure
in good explanations of what is in need of explanation. Or, better perhaps: better
concepts will ﬁgure in good explanations of explananda in need of explanation.³⁴
This by itself may not be enough of a concern. A proponent of might, after
all, have a story about what makes a fact cry out for explanation that does not in turn
rely on epistemic considerations. Trouble is, as far as I can tell no such story has ever
been told. And it is not clear how such a story could be told. For whether something
cries out for explanation or not seems to be highly context-sensitive—whether some
event cries out for explanation seems to depend in part on something like an
epistemic state or a body of theory.
To my knowledge, not much has been written on the question what makes
something cry out for explanation.³⁵ But three families of proposals seem to have
emerged from the relatively small discussion.
which do not ﬁgure in any metaphysical explanations. Concepts corresponding to that property would thus
be good concepts, according to , but not good according to .
³³ This claim is not entirely uncontroversial. See, for example, Friedman (1974: 13): “All phenomena,
from the commonest everyday event to the most abstract processes of modern physics, are equally in need
of explanation—although it is impossible, of course, that they all be explained at once.” Friedman does not
offer an argument for this claim. Instead, he claims he “cannot see any reason but prejudice for regarding
some phenomena as somehow more natural, intelligible, or self-explanatory than others” (p. 13).
³⁴ For examples of the way in which the choice of concepts is sensitive to what is deemed worthy of
explanation, see the discussion the ‘category inﬂuence hypothesis’ in Franklin-(2015: 933)—see especially
the discussion of how classiﬁcatory practices in chemistry, based on atomic numbers, are partly the result
of chemists’ interest in explaining and accounting for certain material transformations, as opposed to the
behavior of material in centrifuges. Cf. also Hendry (2010: 147): “eighteenth-century chemistry and its
nomenclature were shaped by interests in the qualitative patterns of particular kinds of chemical behaviour
(combustion, calcination, acid-base reactions) and explaining them in terms of a particular conception of
elemental composition. These patterns are determined by sameness and difference in nuclear charge, and
quite insensitive to sameness and difference in atomic weight.”Another cluster of examples can be found in
the discussion of the species problem in philosophy of biology. Kitcher (1984), for example, identiﬁes nine
different species concepts, each of which is best suited to a particular explanatory purpose—the presump-
tion then is that different explanatory goals result in different assessments as to the epistemic beneﬁts of a
particular concept. Cf. also Stanford (1995).
³⁵ For a helpful overview of the rather small literature on this topic, see Grimm (2008). See also Wong
and Yudell (2015). Related issues are sometimes discussed in the context of ﬁnetuning arguments—there,
the question is whether the fact that the universe is capable of sustaining life cries out for explanation—in
debates over whether the laws of nature or the universe’s ‘initial conditions’ themselves stand in need of
explanation, and in the debates over physicalism in the philosophy of mind, where the question is whether
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First, there’s what Grimm (2008) calls the ‘surprisingness’ account.³⁶ A fact cries
out for explanation, on this view, to the extent that it is unexpected, or surprising. On
the face of it, this seems like a promising view. But it is hard to cash it out so that it
isn’t vulnerable to obvious counterexamples.³⁷ We are all too familiar with the fact
that the universe appears to be perfectly ﬁne-tuned for the emergence of life. And yet
that alone would not convince those who think that this fact cries out for explanation
that it does not.³⁸
Next, there’s a view we can extract from the writings of Sylvain Bromberger, what
we can call the p-predicament account.³⁹ On this view, a fact cries out for explanation
to the extent that (a) we believe there is a true answer to the question why it obtained,
but (b) any answer we can (currently) think of is ruled out by what we know.⁴⁰
On each of these two views, however, whether something cries out for explanation
is highly dependent on features of our epistemic situation. And they make it hard to
see how something could cry out for explanation tout court, as opposed to crying our
for explanation for a particular agent at a time, or relative to a particular body of
background beliefs.⁴¹
Not all views on what it takes for something to be in need of explanation carry
their sensitivity to epistemic considerations on their sleeves. For example, according
to Stephen Grimm, a fact cries out for explanation just in case it is not necessary,
where the relevant notion of necessity is narrower than broadly logical or even
metaphysical necessity—Grimm does not quite say what the relevant notion is,
other than that it is “tied to our sense of what sort of capacities a thing has, relative
to the kind of thing it is.”⁴² The idea, I take it, is that objects (contingently) have
there are any ‘brute necessities’. See, for example, Levine (1983); Callender (2004); White (2007). White
(2005: 3) offers a plausible necessary condition on what it takes for something to cry out for explanation.
Unfortunately, it does not help our discussion, for it appeals to the very notion of being in need of
explanation that we are trying to illuminate.
³⁶ Grimm attributes this view to Hempel and Peirce. See p. 485 and references therein.
³⁷ Cf. Grimm (2008: 458, n6). A familiar objection due to Peter Lipton is that many things that are not
surprising nonetheless cry out for explanation—the rattle of my car might cry out for explanation, even
though there is nothing surprising about it at this point (see, for example, Lipton 2004: 26). The proposal in
Wong and Yudell (2015) could be understood as a sophisticated attempt at reviving the surprising
account—on their view, a fact cries out for explanation when we are surprised by it not ‘ﬁtting’ with a
background theory (p. 2884).
³⁸ To be sure, there is a way of reading ‘surprising’ on which it is still surprising that the universe we live in
ﬁne-tuned for life. But that reading smells remarkably like a metaphor for being in need of explanation.
³⁹ Bromberger (1962, 1971, 1988, inter alia).
⁴⁰ Bromberger characterizes a p-predicament as an all-or-nothing affair—see, for example, the Intro-
duction to Bromberger (1992). But one could imagine generalizing his deﬁnition so one can be in a
p-predicament to a greater or lesser extent. Presumably, the relevant sense in which we cannot think of an
answer will need to be speciﬁed more explicitly (in this regard, see Bromberger 1971: 117).
⁴¹ The point here is independent of the suggestion, most famously made in van Fraassen (1980:
chapter 5), that whether something is a good explanation of a given explanandum is also highly context-
dependent.
⁴² Grimm (2008: 484). Cf. also p. 494: “a situation stands in need of explanation for someone in virtue of
the person’s sense that there are various alternative ways the subject of the situation (a system, say, or a
substance that constitutes the ‘A‘ in a fact such as A is F) might have been.”
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certain capacities, which themselves determine the sorts of states they might be in.⁴³
And it is because x could have failed to be F that, according to Grimm, x‘s being F is
in need of explanation.
Whatever its merits, though, this view fails to do justice to the guiding contrast
between, say, three strangers winning the three prizes at the town rafﬂe and three
siblings winning the three prizes. On Grimm’s view, each of these is in need of
explanation. Moreover, there isn’t anything to be said for the rather plausible claim
that the second one of these is more in need of explanation than the ﬁrst one, even if
both are in some sense in need of explanation.
There is yet another view worth mentioning, inspired by a passing remark of Cian
Dorr’s.⁴⁴ A fact cries out for explanation just in case it is unlikely, given that it
obtains, that it is does not have a good explanation. On this view, the fact that three
siblings won the three prizes cries out for explanation because it is unlikely, given that
they did win, that there is no good explanation of it.
Now, on a plausible way of spelling this view out, whether something cries out for
explanation will depend on some background epistemic state—a credence function,
say, that could be used to measure the relevant conditional probabilities. But one could
also spell it out so that the relevant conditional probabilities are perfectly objective.⁴⁵ We
would still have to worry about which body of evidence is the relevant one to determine
how unlikely it is—relative to those conditional probabilities and that body of evidence—
that there is no good explanation of some particular fact. But setting that aside, as far as
this view is concerned, there could be many concepts that correspond to elite properties
which have none of the epistemic good-making features that appeal to eliteness was
supposed to explain. Suppose, to illustrate, that there is some concept that correspond to
a perfectly elite property. As far as this view is concerned, it could be that this concept
never ﬁgures in explaining things that cry out for explanation. After all, facts about what
cries out for explanation are not determined by facts about what properties are elite. It
would thus be hard to see how the claim that a concept corresponds to a perfectly elite
property could be what alone explains why it has the epistemic merits that it has.
⁴³ Presumably, Grimm is not thinking of those natures and capacities as being essential to a given thing.
Otherwise, the fact that it is metaphysically possible for A to be F would imply that it is possible for A to be
F even if we hold ﬁxed A‘s nature and capacities, so that the corresponding notion of necessity would be as
strong as metaphysical necessity, contrary to what Grimm suggests.
⁴⁴ The view is discussed in a footnote, modiﬁed by a ‘roughly’, and not obviously wide enough in scope
to apply to anything beyond whole theories. See Dorr (2010: 154, n29): “Roughly, for a claim to cry out for
explanation is for it to be unlikely conditional on its being true that its truth is not explained by that of any
better theory.” There are multiple ways of making sense of this claim. On one, what cries out for
explanation is a complete theory: T cries out for explanation just in case it is unlikely, given T, that T is
not explained by some other theory T' that is better (in the relevant sense) than T. The downside of this
understanding is that the scope is limited to whole theories. Another interpretation is this: a claim C cries out
for explanation just in case it is unlikely, given C, that C is not explained by some theory T' that is better (in
the relevant sense) than C. The downside of this way of thinking about it is that it requires that we ﬁnd a
suitable way of comparing particular claims about some event (say) with complete theories. Perhaps the view
is that T' is better thanC in the relevant sense if it is a better explanation ofC thanC itself. (Though this would
make it hard to see how there could be any claim that does not cry out for explanation, save perhaps for ‘self-
explanatory’ claims, whatever those turn out to be.) Or perhaps the idea is that T' is better (in the relevant
sense) if T' is better than some other salient, available putative explanation of C. I cannot tell.
⁴⁵ As in, for example, Williamson (2000: chapter 10).
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Incidentally, it is worth highlighting a general upshot of this last observation. The
objection to  is not that it would imply, in contrast to all plausible theories of
what it takes to be in need of explanation, that it is an objective matter whether
something cries out for explanation. The objection, rather, is that  would
imply that whether something is in need of explanation has nothing to do with
epistemic considerations. It could be a perfectly objective matter whether something
is in need of explanation relative to a given epistemic situation. So unless we have
some sense as to how being in need of explanation could have nothing to do with
epistemic considerations, we have some reason to think that  cannot be right.
3.3 Trouble with Uniformity
A theory of conceptual evaluation should, if possible, be sufﬁciently general in scope.
We want an answer to the question, what makes for good concepts, epistemically,
that is relatively discipline neutral. To illustrate: an answer that applies uniformly to
both mathematical concepts and concepts from the natural sciences is preferable, all
else equal, than one that does not.
How does  fare with respect to this desideratum?
On the one hand,  generalizes quite nicely to different domains of inquiry.
As long as it makes sense to talk of elite properties in a given domain, we can use
 to answer the question what makes for good concepts in that domain. And
while not all proponents of the elite/non-elite distinction might be willing to coun-
tenance that such a distinction carries over to mathematical properties, for
example,⁴⁶ I will simply assume that the proponent of  is not among them.
On the other hand, digging a little deeper reveals that things are not as straight-
forward as they appear.⁴⁷ According to , what explains why the concept
electron is a good concept is that the property of being an electron is suitably elite.
And what explains why the concept determined game is a good concept is that the
property of being a determined game is also elite.⁴⁸ Ask now: how are these two
explanations supposed to go?
⁴⁶ If elite properties constitute a minimal supervenience base for all of reality, then there is no hope for a
non-trivial theory of elite mathematical properties. And if elite properties are qualitative properties, there is
even less hope for a non-trivial theory of elite mathematical properties. (Cf. Lewis 1991: section 2.6.) None
of this need imply that one cannot give a theory of naturalness for mathematical properties: it’s just that
whatever that theory turns out to be it will have a rather different look than any of the familiar theories of
eliteness. For relevant discussion, see Bricker (n.d.).
⁴⁷ I’m indebted to Tappenden (2008a) for raising the question whether there is a plausible theory of the
natural/non-natural distinction that encompasses both mathematical and non-mathematical properties.
Cf. also the discussion in Tappenden (2008b) of an argument in Sider (1996) for the claim that preference
for one over another way of deﬁning ordered pairs in set theory can only be based on merely pragmatic
considerations.
⁴⁸ A (two player, perfect information) game which does not allow for draws is determined iff one of the
players has a winning strategy: a strategy that will allow her to win no matter what the other player does.
Alternatively, if we allow for games where players can draw, we say that a game is determined if one of the
players has a strategy that guarantees she will not lose. A fundamental theorem attributed to Zermelo (but
see Schwalbe andWalker 2001 for a more accurate account of the history behind the role of Zermelo’s work
in early game theory) is that every ﬁnite game—a game that ends after a ﬁnite number of moves—is
determined. Not all inﬁnite games are determined. Characterizing the class of inﬁnite games that are
determined has proven to be a surprisingly fruitful research program. More on this below.
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Consider one particular theoretical beneﬁt we might expect to accrue from
epistemically good concepts: fruitfulness. A concept is fruitful, as I will understand
the term, when it makes unexpected appearances in dealing with a variety of
questions.⁴⁹ One particularly important way a concept can be fruitful is in lending
itself to successful prediction: one can typically predict features of an unexamined
object falling under that concept on the basis of features of other, examined objects
falling under that same concept. So the question is: why would the fact that a concept
corresponds to an elite property explain that concept’s contributing to successful
prediction?
If we zoom in on a particular class of arguably elite properties—the so-called
natural kinds—we can get some sense of how to answer that question. Kinds, one
might think,⁵⁰ correspond to property clusters that are sustained by certain causal
mechanisms. It is the fact that certain causal mechanisms sustain the co-instantiation
of certain features that explains why concepts corresponding to natural kinds are
projectable.⁵¹
The idea, very roughly, is that properties come in clusters: for example, thermal
and electrical conductivity, ductility, malleability, and having a shiny appearance.
And this clustering is due to the presence of underlying mechanisms (something
having to do with the presence of free electrons, in our example) which ensure that
those properties tend to be coinstantiated.⁵² As a result, the property being metal is a
property that supports inductive generalizations: from the fact that the temperature
of a given metal is inversely proportional to its conductivity, one is warranted in
inferring that the temperature of other metals is too. This at least gives us a sketch of
a story as to how the metaphysics of the property corresponding to our conceptmetal
can account for the role that this concept plays in our epistemic practices.
Now, much like the concept being metal, the concept determined game is a fruitful
concept. To see what I mean, let me take a moment to introduce some deﬁnitions.
Any given set of real numbers can be identiﬁed with a unique set of sequences of
natural numbers. For any set A of sequences of natural numbers, we can deﬁne the
⁴⁹ Note here that at least some of the problems raised by Nolan (1999) against taking the fruitfulness of a
theory to be an epistemic virtue do not arise for thinking of fruitfulness as an epistemically good-making
feature of concepts. As Nolan points out, if the fruitfulness of a theory is, as the term might suggest, a
matter of it giving rise to new problems or opening up new lines of inquiry, it is hard to see how fruitfulness
(or ‘fertility’, to use Nolan’s term) would be an epistemic virtue. To think so would be like thinking that
“ ‘Faces many problems’ or ‘Could do better’ or ‘Much room for improvement’ are high praise on the report
card of a theory” (p. 267). Similar concerns do not carry over to thinking of fruitfulness of concepts as an
epistemically good thing.
⁵⁰ See, for example, Boyd (1988); Kornblith 1993); Millikan (1999).
⁵¹ It is telling that such homeostatic property clusters can in principle be sustained by the intentional
activities of human beings. See, for example, Mallon (2003). Presumably, such properties would not count
as elite on any reasonable theory of eliteness. Otherwise, whether a property is elite would depend on
contingent facts about human interests at a given point in time. (In this respect, the discussion of the
concept of the  in Coyle (2014), and the way in which changes in the economymake it a less than useful
concept can serve as an illustration of this point.) That suggests that the explanation for why concepts
corresponding to these properties turn out to be epistemically valuable will have little to do with the
eliteness of the relevant properties. But this is a line of argument I do not intend to pursue here. (Thanks to
Hilary Kornblith for discussion on this point.)
⁵² Cf. Boyd (1999: 82f).
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two-player game G as follows: players I and II alternate picking a natural number;
player I wins iff the resulting sequence is an element of A—else, player II wins. We
say that a set of real numbers A is determined iff GA is determined.
It is well-known that all open sets (countable unions of disjoint open intervals) and
all Borel sets (sets obtained from open sets by closing under countable unions,
countable intersections, and relative complements) are determined. The Axioms of
Deﬁnable Determinacy state that all ‘deﬁnable’ sets of reals are determined—I write
‘axioms’ because there are different ways of making the notion of deﬁnability precise,
each of which corresponds to a particular axiom of deﬁnable determinacy.⁵³ Axioms
of Deﬁnable Determinacy have been a driving force behind much work in set theory
over the last thirty years.⁵⁴ The study of determinacy did not just result in a number
of general results about how well-behaved ‘reasonably deﬁnable’ sets of real numbers
are—for instance, it is known that all determined sets of reals are Lebesgue measur-
able, have the Baire property, and contain a perfect subset if uncountable—but also
served to establish deep connections between two seemingly unrelated branches of
set theory: the study of large cardinals and descriptive set theory.⁵⁵
Indeed, it would not be implausible to talk of the notion of determinacy as being
projectible: it seems reasonable to conclude, from the assumption that all sets of reals
we have been able to deﬁne are determined, that all deﬁnable sets of reals are
determined, even though strong versions of deﬁnable determinacy are independent
of the standard axioms of set theory.⁵⁶ Moreover, axioms of deﬁnable determinacy
have been crucial in proving results in a range of different areas which later turned out
to be provable in much weaker theories.⁵⁷ Thus, the notion of determinacy seems to
have as good a claim at being an epistemically good concept as any natural kind term.
Of course, we cannot explain the fruitfulness of the notion of determinacy in the
same way we explained the fruitfulness of the species concept. It would be quite a
stretch to posit something analogous to a causal mechanism which sustains (in a
non-causal way) the clustering of so-called regularity properties (Lebesgue measur-
ability, etc.) around determined sets of reals. So a very different type of explanation
will be needed to account for the fact that concepts corresponding to elite mathem-
atical properties turn out to be fruitful. Such a story might well be forthcoming—
perhaps mathematical properties have their own, distinctive way of being elite, one
which explains the fruitfulness of the corresponding concepts. But as far as I can tell,
no such story has ever been told. (The view that for a mathematical property to be
⁵³ Perhaps the best-known of these axioms states that all sets of reals in L(ℝ)—the smallest transitive
model of set theory that contains all reals and all the ordinals—are determined.
⁵⁴ For an overview of some of the main results, see Koellner (2014); Welch (2015); as well as Maddy
(2011: chapter II). For some of the mathematical details, see, for example, Kanamori (2009: chapter 6).
⁵⁵ The canonical reference here is Shelah and Woodin (1990). See Larson (2012); Koellner (2014) for a
more comprehensive list of references.
⁵⁶ This is not an isolated example. See, for example, the discussion in Tappenden (2008b) of the
quadratic reciprocity theorem and the role that ‘projecting’ on the predicate ‘is a quadratic residue’—
and relatedly, the introduction of the Legendre symbol—played in the discovery of the theorem. Unlike in
the case of axioms of determinacy, which have been accepted on ‘mere’ non-deductive grounds, the
quadratic reciprocity theorem admits of a direct proof. See also the discussion of the concept of ﬁeld,
and the way it contrasts with Frege’s concept of a ‘quantitative domain’, in Tappenden (2005: 20f).
⁵⁷ For further discussion, see Martin (1998).
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elite is in part for the corresponding concepts to be fruitful would certainly not do.)
And without such a story, a proponent of  will be unable to give a uniﬁed
answer to the question, what makes for good concepts, epistemically?
(Note that what I say here is perfectly compatible with the claim that fruitfulness of
mathematical concepts is evidence that they correspond to elite mathematical prop-
erties.⁵⁸ What I’m calling into question is the existence of a suitable notion of
eliteness for mathematical properties that might explain why concepts corresponding
to such properties are fruitful.⁵⁹)
3.4 Concept and Property
I have been presupposing, for the sake of compliance with the presuppositions of
, that to each concept corresponds a unique property. It is only given this
assumption that  can be formulated: if a concept corresponds to multiple
properties, then we are not guaranteed that concepts can be compared in terms of the
eliteness of the corresponding properties.
Now, for reasons all too familiar, this presupposition is not quite right—at least
given plausible assumptions about how to individuate concepts. For instance, consider
the concept local. Intuitively, there is no one property—the property of being local as it
were—that corresponds to that concept. Rather, in different contexts, different prop-
erties are predicated of an object that is judged to fall under that concept.⁶⁰
A proponent of  could now restrict her view so that it only applies to
concepts that do meet this presupposition. So let us banish ‘local’ from among the
candidates to good concepts—banish, too, concepts like leftmost, tall, and currently
fashionable. In principle, there is nothing objectionable to this strategy. The worry is
that banishing context-sensitive concepts—concepts that correspond to different
properties in different contexts—will leave us with little to apply  to. In
particular, the concern is that by banishing context-sensitive concepts we may end
up banishing the very concepts we want a theory of conceptual evaluation to apply to.
What motivates this idea is the observation that many of our seemingly non-
context-sensitive terms appear upon reﬂection to be context-sensitive after all.⁶¹ Take
a familiar example, from (Chomsky 1976):⁶²
⁵⁸ Cf. Maddy (2011), whose ‘thin realism’ is based on the idea that the success of the set-theoretic methods
is evidence that those methods are tracking the ‘underlying contours of mathematical depth’ (p. 82).
⁵⁹ For a nice summary of different attempts at cashing out a notion of mathematical depth—as well as
their limitations—see Arana (2015). Arana’s discussion is focused on a notion of depth as applied to
mathematical theorems. But many of the issues he raises could be transposed into a discussion of depth as
applied to mathematical properties.
⁶⁰ Even proponents of so-called semantic minimalism would grant that there is no such thing as the
property of being local simpliciter. See Cappelen and Lepore (2005: 1). (Admittedly, Cappelen and Lepore
express some skepticism that we should treat so-called contextuals as genuinely context-sensitive
expressions—see fn. 1, p. 1.).
⁶¹ The relevance of this brief foray into the debate over the extent of context-sensitivity in natural
languages to our discussion about concepts should become clearer shortly.
⁶² See also Chomsky (1995, 2000), and many other places. For illuminating discussion of these and
related observations, see Pietroski (2003); Collins (2009).
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(3) a. John wrote a book.
b. The book weighs ﬁve pounds.
As Chomsky points out (p. 48), the term book behaves differently in the two
sentences in (3). In (3a), it must pick out an abstract entity: the book that John
wrote can survive the destruction of the original ﬁle it was stored in. In (3b), however,
it must pick out a concrete entity, capable of having mass. Interestingly, what is going
on in (3) cannot obviously be explained by claiming that the two occurrences of book
correspond to different lexical items. After all,
(4) John wrote a book that weighs ﬁve pounds.
is perfectly acceptable, in contrast with (e.g.)
(5) Jumbo waved his trunk, which was full of clothes.
which is to
(6) a. Jumbo waved his trunk.
b. The trunk was full of clothes.
like (4) is to (3).⁶³
And book is not unique in this regard. Consider (from Chomsky 2000: 37):
(7) a. London is unhappy.
b. London is ugly.
c. London is polluted.
d. London is so unhappy, ugly, and polluted that it should be destroyed and
rebuilt 100 miles away
Again, it seems as if London denotes slightly different things in (7a)–(7c), and yet the
acceptability of (7d) suggests that we are not dealing with multiple lexical items here.
Also consider (cf. Chomsky 1970: n. 7 and 1976: 49f):
(8) a. The temperature is rising.
b. The temperature is 70°.
c. The temperature, which was 70°, is rising.
(9) a. Mary wrote the proof in pen and paper.
b. The proof will have a lasting impact on the history of mathematics.
c. Mary wrote a proof, in pen and paper, that will have a lasting impact on
the history of mathematics.
To be sure the arguments here are not decisive.⁶⁴ But they strongly suggests that
terms like book, proof, and temperature, display a certain amount of unexpected
⁶³ Example (5) is example (19ii) in Chomsky (1976).
⁶⁴ See for example the discussion of Partee’s so-called temperature paradox in Montague (1973), as well
as the more recent discussion in Lasersohn (2018).
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context-sensitivity, so that the property corresponding to each such predicate varies
from context to context.⁶⁵
All that said, these examples might appear somewhat irrelevant to the more
interesting questions surrounding conceptual evaluation from an epistemic perspec-
tive. After all, they all concern what we could call ‘folk’, or ‘common-sense’ concepts.
And it is tempting to think that part of what scientiﬁc progress consists in is the
abandonment of such concepts. Once we narrow our attention to the conceptual
tools actually used in mature sciences, we will no longer be faced with the kind of
context-sensitivity that might otherwise get in the way of something like .⁶⁶
Or so one might think. But unfortunately for the proponent of , it looks like
many of the concepts that play a signiﬁcant role in (non-fundamental) sciences can’t
quite be assigned to a single property. The phenomenon—which, following Wilson
(2006) we can call the ‘multi-valuedness’ of the relevant concepts—is best understood
by looking at some examples.
Consider the concept hardness.⁶⁷ What is the property corresponding to it? Of
course, one could say that the property corresponding to the concept hardness is,
well, the property of hardness. But in trying to ﬁnd anything illuminating to
say about what that property is—something that we might undoubtedly need to
do in order to ﬁgure out its position on the eliteness scale—we quickly ﬁnd ourselves
at a loss.
There are different more or less familiar tests for hardness—scratching tests,
indentation tests, rapping tests, among others.⁶⁸ Which test is deemed appropriate
depends on a variety of factors, including the type of material being tested for
hardness. As Wilson writes (2006: 336):
[I]n everyday contexts we adjudicate the “hardnesses” of various materials, both comparatively
and absolutely, through a wide variety of comparatively easy to apply tests—we might squeeze
the material or indent it with a hammer; attempt to scratch it or rap upon it; and so on. In most
cases, we will be scarcely aware of the exact technique we will have employed for this appraisal:
“Did I rap, squeeze or scratch that piece of wood? I can’t really remember.” In fact, our choice
of tests is likely to have been suggested by the material in question: we instinctively appraise a
⁶⁵ It is of course a non-trivial question to explain why these terms get to behave the way they seem to in
sentences like (9c), and I have nothing to offer by way of explanation here.
⁶⁶ Indeed, Chomsky himself—insisting as he does that developing ‘referential’ semantics is the wrong
way to go about studying meaning—seems to leave it open whether terms introduced in the natural
sciences are well-behaved enough so that each term or concept corresponds to a unique property (see
Chomsky 2000: 42f). On Chomsky’s view, part of what prevents terms like London or house from being
part of a ‘mature’ science (which Chomsky takes to mean that clauses like ‘London refers to London’ cannot
be part of any serious scientiﬁc study of meaning) is that they are “used to refer to concrete objects, but
from the standpoint of special human interests and goals and with curious properties”. And the evidence
for this is that, for example, “[a] house can be destroyed and rebuilt, like a city; London could be completely
destroyed and rebuilt up the Thames in 1,000 years and still be London, under some circumstances”
(p. 21). No term belonging to mature ‘naturalistic inquiry’ should thus display the characteristics of terms
like London or house. If the relevant characteristics include the seeming context-sensitivity of such terms,
Chomsky must then think that highly context-sensitive items should be banished from good scientiﬁc
vocabularies. Cf. Stoljar (2015).
⁶⁷ As should become clear, my discussion here is deeply indebted to Wilson (1982 as well as 2006).
⁶⁸ Wilson (2006: chapter 6, ix).
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wood by rapping upon it, a rubber by squeezing, a metal by attempting to make a small
imprint; a glass or ceramic by rapping lightly or scratching (not by trying to make a small
imprint!).
But the type of material alone does not determine which particular test is appropriate.
A hunk of steel, for example, may sometimes be tested using an indentation test—
measuring the diameter of an indentation left behind by a steel ball that is placed on
its surface for a ﬁxed amount of time, as in the familiar Brinell tests—but also using
an abrasion test. And the two tests can yield conﬂicting verdicts as to the comparative
hardness of different types of steel.⁶⁹ It is partly because of this that one ﬁnds in the
literature on hardness tests claims to the effect that hardness is not a ‘fundamental’
property, or that there may be no such thing as the property of hardness.⁷⁰
At this point, it might be tempting to conclude that the concept hardness is
somehow defective. And indeed, there may be some sense in which it is. But it
would be unreasonable to conclude from this that there is nothing to be said for it,
epistemically, given the way it is embedded in a network involving other macroscopic
concepts like solid, rigid body, and force which seem essential to our understanding of
the macro world.⁷¹
Can the proponent of  explain what makes hardness an epistemically good
concept? One possibility would be to insist that there really are multiple concepts in
place: Brinell hardness, scratch hardness, and so on. The mistake, according to this
line of thinking, is to think that there is a single concept whose epistemic credentials
we need to account for. Rather, there are multiple concepts, each one of which is
epistemically good in its own right. It is merely an accident of the way English
developed that we have homonyms corresponding to different concepts.
There are at least two problems with this strategy, however. First, and perhaps least
signiﬁcantly in this context, this strategy would fail to do justice to the way that the
⁶⁹ Cf. Wilson (2006: 338). Of course, in discussing these issues authors sometimes appeal to qualiﬁers to
avoid confusion. Thus, Walley (2012: 1033) disambiguates and talks about “the relation between Brinell
hardness and resistance to abrasion” not being as straightforward as one might have expected. But
sometimes, authors expect readers to disambiguate according to context, as in, for example, Malzbender
et al. (2002: 52): “hardness is not a fundamental property of materials. Hardness is related to material
properties, in particular to the yield strength and the elastic modulus, but this relationship depends on the
indenter geometry. We should, therefore, be careful when comparing hardness values from different
sources.” Additional examples of this way of exploiting the ambiguity of ‘hardness’ are easy to ﬁnd in
the literature.
⁷⁰ For example, Newey and Weaver (2013: 13): “A hard material is difﬁcult to scratch, wear away by
abrasion or to indent. Hardness is not a fundamental property of a material: for each method of measuring
it, it is some combination of elastic, plastic, and (in some cases) fracture properties. Hardness can be
measured only by comparison with a material used as a scratcher or indenter and has objective meaning
only in terms of a speciﬁc type of test. For example, glass will scratch steel but fractures more readily under
indentation; nylon has a high resistance to wear but not to indentation.”And Cahn and Lifshin (1993: 183):
“Although there is probably no such property as ‘hardness’, it is a convenient generic test.” See also the
quotes from Samuel Williams in Wilson (2006: 350).
⁷¹ Cf. the discussion of solidity inWilson (2006: 352–3). AsWilson points out, the notion of solidity that
is usefully applied to macroscopic objects—solid objects are those that “preserve their volume under all
interactions, as long as they remain integral” (p. 354)—is not the one we would rely on when discussing the
microscopic interactions between objects, for it is precisely by “not acting like a solid at the molecular level”
that a piece of steel does not crumble into dust under mild applied stress.
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term ‘hardness’ is actually used. The apparent ambiguity or polysemy of ‘hardness’
does not seem to pattern with lexically ambiguous terms like ‘bank’. It would be at
best an unimaginative joke to say: “there are two different kinds of banks: river banks
and ﬁnancial institutions”. But talk of different kinds of hardness is not out place in
the literature on materials science,⁷² as is the claim that hardness is the capacity to
resist penetration or abrasion, when there is no property that accounts both for
resistance to penetration and resistance to abrasion.⁷³
The second problem is that there seems to be no explanation, on this way of
thinking, for why these allegedly different concepts are ‘linked’ together in the way
they are. It certainly seems as if part of what lets concepts like hardness play the role
they do in understanding macro phenomena is that they adjust themselves almost
unnoticeably so as to pick out different properties in different contexts, or, if we
prefer, so as to take each other’s place (the different concepts) in different contexts.
And this seems to be something over and above the putative eliteness of the
properties corresponding to each of the ways in which hardness is used.
To see what I have in mind, consider a different example, one where the ‘switch’
from property to property is induced not by focusing on a different material
but by ‘shifting scales’.⁷⁴ When considering a three-dimensional object at the
macro-level, we think of its surface as consisting of a two-dimensional ‘skin’ that
surrounds it. Now, there are well-known puzzles that arise from applying these
topological notions to macroscopic objects.⁷⁵ But there’s no denying the immense
fruitfulness of doing so. This is not just in the sense that our folk-theoretic
understanding of macroscopic objects in some sense presupposes that surfaces
are aptly thought of in topological terms. These topological notions are essential to
continuum mechanics, for example, even if doing so requires a certain amount of
theoretical acrobatics.⁷⁶
Consider now what it takes for something to be a surface when looked at from a
‘micro’ point of view. There, it makes sense to think of surfaces as lattice structures
⁷² Cf. the quoted passage in fn. 69.
⁷³ Cf. also Wilson (1982: 575f ): “We can meaningfully ascribe an extension (with certain implicit
parameters) to the everyday use of ‘is 90° ’ which differs from that appropriate to the temperature experts
in our society. There is a natural temptation to claim that the experts assign a somewhat differentmeaning
(or sense) to ‘is 90° ’ than the rest of us. The fact that ‘is 90° ’ corresponds to two fairly clearcut ranges of
application represents an interesting aspect of English linguistics, but this common phenomenon should be
regarded as sui generis and not lumped with ambiguities of ‘meaning’ such as the word ‘bank’ displays.
Intuitive talk of the ‘varying senses’ of ‘is 90° ’ is unexceptionable if understood merely as a description of
the double range of application, but it should not mislead us into supposing that the experts ‘grasp’ a
distinct concept (especially when physicists employ the term in the same way as the rest of us in ordinary
conversation with no sense of disharmony with their laboratory practice).”
⁷⁴ What follows owes much to Wilson (2006); Batterman (2013); Bursten (2018).
⁷⁵ For a nice summary of some of the issues, see Arntzenius (2008); Varzi (2015).
⁷⁶ See, for example, the discussion of how spray can form on the the surface of water in Wilson (2006:
210). As Wilson points out, if we start with a smooth water surface and play out the differential equations
governing the ﬂow of wind and water, we will never get the change in topology required in order for a bit of
the surface to break off into a water droplet. As a result, some acrobatics are necessary in order to model the
generation of the spray. The way Wilson describes it, “[w]hen a change in the ﬂuid’s topology looks
imminent, practitioners begin investigating two ﬂuid conﬁgurations that run in parallel, one containing the
still attached drop and the other describing a drop of similar shape detached from its ocean.”
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made up of atoms ‘connected’ to one another by electromagnetic forces. It is by
looking at the details of these structures that we can explain, say, why a given metal
spoon will bend more easily than a seemingly identical one made of the same
material. It is because of slight imperfections on the surface of the spoon—so-
called dislocations, which are essentially irregularities in the crystalline structure of
the material—that a steel spoon can be bent, the quantity and distribution of
dislocations determining how easy it is for it to bend. And it is because of the
presence of ‘gaps’ between the atoms that make up the surface of a metal beam that
oxidation occurs⁷⁷—which in turn explains why so-called cold-welding does not
happen in everyday situations.⁷⁸
Our concept surface, then, seems to pick out different properties depending
on something like a background choice of scale.⁷⁹ A proponent of  might
thus be inclined to think that there are different concepts here, one for each
choice of scale, and offer independent explanations for why each of them is
epistemically good.
Now, on the face of it, there is something appealing about the view on which we
have different surface concepts—a ‘continuum’ surface concept and an ‘atomistic’
surface concept. Yet there are many ways in which these concepts are related: for
instance, changes in the microstructure of the surface of the object will in turn affect
how the surface should be modeled in continuum mechanics.
Suppose, for instance, we are interested in explaining the way in which hammering
a piece of metal might affect its macroscopic properties (through so-called work-
hardening, one can strengthen a hunk of steel by making it less ductile). We may
need to start by modeling its surface at the microlevel (perhaps because a blow
resulted on some cleavage cracks along the surface, introducing dislocations) and
model the rest of the steel using a continuum model. But as the hammering of the
steel goes on, and the surface dislocations start moving down to the bulk of the steel,
our model of the surface may need to switch: extending the atomistic model along the
path that the dislocation takes will quickly become prohibitive.
⁷⁷ See Cadavid and Cabot (2017) for an accessible discussion of this point.
⁷⁸ Cf. Wilson (2008: 285f ): “The outer molecular layers of an iron bar (which are anti-averaged into the
usual two-dimensional boundary conditions of elasticity theory) actually comprise an extremely complex
region when viewed up close.”
I was alerted to the possibility of cold-welding in the absence of ‘greasy atmospheric crud’ by Wilson
(2006: 373). A particularly dramatic illustration of what can happen to metal once oxides are removed is
the well-known anomaly in the deployment of the antenna of the Galileo spacecraft: two metal parts were
essentially ‘welded’ to one another, preventing the antenna from fully deploying. See, for example, Miyoshi
(1999) for some of the details. Further discussion of the more general issues can be found in the works cited
in fn. 92 of Wilson (2006, loc. cit.).
⁷⁹ Another example of this type of scale-dependence, also from Mark Wilson, is the concept force. As
Wilson puts it (Wilson 2013: 54): “The term force has a notorious tendency to alter its exact signiﬁcance as
characteristic scale lengths are adjusted. At a macroscopic level, the ‘rolling friction’ that slows a ball upon a
rigid track is a simple Newton-style force opposing the onward motion. But at a lower scale length, the
seemingly ‘rigid’ tracks are not so ﬁrm after all: they elongate under the weight of the sphere to a nontrivial
degree. So part of the work required to move our ball against friction consists in the fact that it must travel
further than is apparent. But when we consider the ‘forces’ on our ball at a macrolevel, we instinctively treat
the track length as ﬁxed and allocate the effects of its actual elongation to a portion of the ‘force of rolling
friction’ budget.”
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Or suppose we are trying to understand the way in which enough stress on a hunk
of metal can lead to fracture.⁸⁰ If we rely simply on a continuum mechanical
description of the phenomena, we will be unable to predict the emergence of cracks
along the surface of our metal—cracks which will grow and result in fracture. This is
because introducing cracks requires a change in the topology of our surface, which
cannot be predicted by the continuous deformation allowed in a continuum mech-
anical setting. So in order to account for the emergence of cracks, we need to switch
to modeling the surface at a microscale. Unfortunately, we cannot just model the
phenomenon of interest entirely at the atomic level, for the number of atoms along
our surface is computationally intractable. For these purposes, physicists have devel-
oped multiscale models, where different models of a surface (say) are ‘linked’
together, so that part of the surface where cracks emerge and grow are modeled at
the atomic level and the rest of the surface—along and beyond which the applied
stress will ﬂow in a somewhat predictable manner—using a continuum model.⁸¹
And these relations are not clearly explicable in terms of law-like relations among
the corresponding properties (for one, the property corresponding to the ‘continuum’
surface concept is one that no concrete object has in this world, so there could not be
any law-like connection between instantiations of the property corresponding to the
‘atomistic’ surface concept and instantiations of the property corresponding to
the ‘continuum’ one). Moreover, thinking of the difference between the two surface
concepts as a simple case of lexical ambiguity would fail to do justice to the fact that
both continuum and atomistic models of the effects of cleavage on a surface are models
of the same phenomenon. We would be mischaracterizing multiscale modeling of
materials if we thought of them as concerned with different phenomena at the same
time, rather than as concerned with the same phenomenon at different scales.
Granted, the proponent of  could instead insist that there is a single
operative concept here, viz. the ‘atomistic’ surface concept. Talk of surfaces as
continuous regions is, on this view, strictly speaking false. Still, the fact remains
that the ‘continuum’ surface concept (assuming, for the sake of argument, that it is a
different concept) plays a role in explanations which, according to ,
should be deemed an epistemically good concept. Exactly what explains that it is an
epistemically good concept is a difﬁcult question. But it is hard to see how the answer
will be compatible with .
⁸⁰ Perhaps a more pressing explanandum is the fact that the force required to slide a block over a ﬂat
surface is proportional to the block’s weight but independent of the apparent area of contact—the so-called
Amonton Law of Friction. The orthodox explanation appeals to the fact that, because of surface asperities,
the true area of contact is much smaller than the apparent area of contact and it increases by way of
deformation of these asperities in proportion to the applied compressive force. But alternative multiscale
explanations—that do not appeal to surface roughness—are available, appealing instead, for instance, to
the presence of self-healing cracks on the surface of the materials in proportion to the ratio of horizontal to
compressive stress. See Gerde and Marder (2001) for discussion. See also Krim (1996) (and references
therein) for a survey of the limitations of explanations appealing to surface roughness.
⁸¹ See, for example, Zhang, Johnston, and Chattopadhyay (2014: 120): “The phenomenon of fatigue
involves multiple length scales including crack nucleation in the microscale, coalescence of microcracks in
the mesoscale and major crack propagation in the macroscale. Therefore, it is critical to develop a
lengthscale-dependent and physics-based model to understand material performance and ultimately assess
the survivability of complex structural systems.” See also Rudd and Broughton (2000: esp. section 1).
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4 Where to Next?
I wish I had an alternative story to offer, here, as to what makes for epistemically
good concepts. Unfortunately, I do not. But I think there are a number of lessons to
be drawn from our discussion so far, lessons that any such alternative story must take
into account. In closing, I want to brieﬂy go over what I take those lessons to be.
First, it may turn out to be impossible to give an informative answer to the
question what makes for epistemically good concepts without making more substan-
tive assumptions about what concepts are. The role that concepts—or meanings, if
you would rather avoid talk of concepts altogether—play in our ability to make sense
of the world around us cannot be fully accounted for in terms of a list of properties
that the relevant concepts correspond to. We thus need a better grip on what
concepts are—other than whatever mediates our representation of properties—in
order to understand what makes some concepts better suited to our epistemic
projects than others.
Second, we should be open to the possibility that no purely ‘metaphysical’ answer
to our question will be forthcoming. Nothing in what I’ve said here rules out the
possibility that some story that is not sensitive to features of our epistemic situation—
one that goes beyond the relative eliteness of the properties corresponding to
concepts—might be the best answer to the question what makes for epistemically
good concepts. (Perhaps there are some relations among properties such that con-
cepts are epistemically good to the extent that they are associated with a family of
suitably related, sufﬁciently elite properties.) But unless it is roughly as simple as
, we have no reason to favor an answer that is independent of our epistemic
circumstances to one that is not—the one thing  had going for it, which might
have led to our thinking that something like it had better be right, was its simplicity.
Any story about what makes for epistemically good concepts will, I suspect, turn out
to be rather complex. Whether that complexity will come from the metaphysics of
properties or from facts about the way in which creatures with our cognitive
capacities interact with our rather complex environment is an open question.
Acknowledgements
For helpful comments, discussion, and advice, thanks to Phil Bricker, Maya Eddon, Nina
Emery, Sophie Horowitz, Joe Levine, Chris Meacham, Katia Vavova, and participants at the
2016 workshop on Conceptual Engineering at the CSMN, University of Oslo. Special thanks to
Alexi Burgess and Hilary Kornblith for extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
chapter.
References
Antony, Louise. 2003. Who’s Afraid of Disjunctive Properties? Philosophical Issues 13:1–21.
Arana, Andrew. 2015. On the Depth of Szemerédi’s Theorem. Philosophia Mathematica
23 (2):163–76.
Armstrong, David M. 1978. Universals and Scientiﬁc Realism, vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/12/2019, SPi
 :  
Arntzenius, Frank. 2008. Gunk, Topology and Measure. In Dean Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford
Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 4 (pp. 225–47). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Batterman, Robert W. 2013. The Tyranny of Scales. In Robert W. Batterman (ed.), Oxford
Handbook of the Philosophy of Physics (pp. 255–86). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Berker, Selim. 2018. The Unity of Grounding. Mind 127 (507):729–77.
Blackburn, Simon. 1998. Ruling Passions. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Boyd, Richard. 1988. How to Be a Moral Realist. In Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (ed.), Essays on
Moral Realism (pp. 181–228). Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Boyd, Richard. 1999. Kinds, Complexity and Multiple Realization. Philosophical Studies
95 (1):67–98.
Bricker, Philip. 1992. Realism without Parochialism. Unpublished manuscript, University of
Massachusetts, Amherst. Symposium paper at the Paciﬁc APA meeting, 1992.
Brigandt, Ingo. 2003. Homology in Comparative, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental
Biology: The Radiation of a Concept. Journal of Experimental Zoology Part B: Molecular and
Developmental Evolution 299B (1):9–17.
Brigandt, Ingo. 2010. The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting for the Rationality of
Semantic Change and Variation. Synthese 117 (1):19–40.
Bromberger, Sylvain. 1962. An Approach to Explanation. In R. J. Butler (ed.), Analytical
Philosophy, vol. 2 (pp. 72–105). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Reprinted in Bromberger
(1992: 18–51). Page numbers refer to the reprinted version.
Bromberger, Sylvain. 1966. Why-Questions. In Robert G. Colodny (ed.), Mind and Cosmos:
Essays in Contemporary Science and Philosophy, vol. 3 (pp. 86–111). University of Pitts-
burgh Series in the Philosophy of Science. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
Reprinted in Bromberger 1992: pp. 101–11. Page numbers refer to the reprinted version.
Bromberger, Sylvain. 1971. Science and the Forms of Ignorance. In Maurice Mandelbaum
(ed.), Observation and Theory in Science. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. Reprinted in
Bromberger (1992: 112–27). Page numbers refer to the reprinted version.
Bromberger, Sylvain. 1988. Rational Ignorance. Synthese 74 (1):47–64. Reprinted in Bromber-
ger 1992: pp. 128–144. Page numbers refer to the reprinted version.
Bromberger, Sylvain. 1992. On What We Know We Don’t Know. Chicago and Stanford: The
University of Chicago Press and .
Burgess, Alexis, and Plunkett, David. 2013a. Conceptual Ethics I. Philosophy Compass 8
(12):1091–101.
Burgess, Alexis, and Plunkett, David. 2013b. Conceptual Ethics II. Philosophy Compass 8
(12):1102–10.
Burgess, John P. 2005. Being Explained Away. Harvard Review of Philosophy 13 (2):41–56.
Bursten, Julia R. 2018. Smaller Than a Breadbox: Scale and Natural Kinds. British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):1–23.
Cadavid, Doris, and Cabot, Andreu. 2017. Oxidation at the Atomic Scale. Science
356 (6335):245.
Cahn, Robert W., and Lifshin, Eric. (eds.) 1993. Concise Encyclopedia of Materials Character-
ization. Oxford: Pergamon Press.
Callender, Craig. 2004. Measures, Explanations and the Past: Should ‘Special’ Initial Condi-
tions be Explained? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (2):195–217.
Cappelen, Herman, and Lepore, Ernie. 2005. Insensitive Semantics: A Defense of Semantic
Minimalism and Speech Act Pluralism. Oxford: Blackwell.
Chomsky, Noam. 1970. Remarks on Nominalization. In Roderick A. Jacobs and
Peter S. Rosenbaum (eds.), Readings in English Transformational Grammar
(pp. 184–221). Waltham: Ginn & Co.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/12/2019, SPi
  ´ 
Chomsky, Noam. 1976. On the Nature of Language. Annals of the New York Academy of
Sciences 280 (1):46–57.
Chomsky, Noam. 1995. Language and Nature. Mind 104 (413):1–61.
Chomsky, Noam. 2000. New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Collins, John. 2009. Methodology, Not Metaphysics: Against Semantic Externalism. Proceed-
ings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):53–69.
Coyle, Diane. 2014. GDP: A Brief but Affectionate History. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Dasgupta, Shamik. 2009. Individuals: An Essay in Revisionary Metaphysics. Philosophical
Studies 145 (1):35–67.
Dasgupta, Shamik. 2018. Realism and the Absence of Value. Philosophical Review
127 (3):279–322.
Dorr, Cian. 2010. Of Numbers and Electrons. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 90
(2):133–81.
Dorr, Cian, and Hawthorne, John. 2013. Naturalness. In Karen Bennett and Dean
W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 8 (pp. 3–77) Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Eddon, Maya. 2013. Fundamental Properties of Fundamental Properties. In Karen Bennett and
Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 8 (pp. 78–104). Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Enoch, David. 2011. Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Ereshefsky, Marc. 2008. Species. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Fall. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Fantl, Jeremy. 2006. Is Metaethics Morally Neutral? Paciﬁc Philosophical Quarterly
87 (1):24–44.
Fine, Kit. 2012. Guide to Ground. In Fabrice Correia and Benjamin Schnieder (eds.), Meta-
physical Grounding: Understanding the Structure of Reality (37–80). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1974. Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis).
Synthese 28 (2):97–15.
Fodor, Jerry A. 1975. The Language of Thought. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
van Fraassen, Bas C. 1980. The Scientiﬁc Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Franklin-Hall, Laura R. 2007. Bacteria, Sex, and Systematics. Philosophy of Science
74 (1):69–95. Originally published under the name “Laura R. Franklin”.
Franklin-Hall, Laura R. 2015. Natural Kinds as Categorical Bottlenecks. Philosophical Studies
172 (4):925–48.
Friedman, Michael. 1974. Explanation and Scientiﬁc Understanding. Journal of Philosophy
71 (1):5–19.
Gärdenfors, Peter. 2000. Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Gerde, Eric, and Marder, M. 2001. Friction and Fracture. Nature 413 (6853):285–8.
Gibbard, Allan. 1990. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Greco, Daniel. 2015. Epistemological Open Questions. Australasian Journal of Philosophy
93 (3):509–23.
Grimm, Stephen R. 2008. Explanatory Inquiry and the Need for Explanation. British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):481–97.
Hall, Ned. 2011. The Large-Scale Joints of the World. Humana.Mente 19:11–39.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/12/2019, SPi
 :  
Hammond, Peter J. 1988. Consequentialist Foundations for Expected Utility Theory. Theory
and Decision 25 (1):25–78.
Haslanger, Sally. 2000. Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What) DoWeWant Them to Be?
Noûs 34 (1):31–55.
Hazlett, Allan. 2017. Understanding and Structure. In Stephen R. Grimm (ed.), Making Sense
of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Hendry, Robin Findlay. 2010. The Elements and Conceptual Change. In Helen Beebee and
Nigel Sabbarton-Leary (eds.), The Semantics andMetaphysics of Natural Kinds (pp. 137–58).
Oxford: Routledge.
Kanamori, Akihiro. 2009. The Higher Inﬁnite: Large Cardinals in Set Theory from Their
Beginnings, 2nd edn. Berlin: Springer.
Kitcher, Philip. 1984. Species. Philosophy of Science 51:308–33.
Kitcher, Philip. 2008. Carnap and the Caterpillar. Philosophical Topics 36 (1):111–27.
Koellner, Peter. 2014. Large Cardinals and Determinacy. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University.
Kornblith, Hilary. 1993. Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
Krim, Jacqueline. 1996. Friction at the Atomic Scale. Scientiﬁc American 275 (4):74–80.
Larson, Paul B. 2012. A Brief History of Determinacy. In Akihiro Kanamori, Dov Gabbay, and
John Woods (eds.), Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 6: Sets and Extensions in the
Twentieth Century (pp. 457–508). Amsterdam: North Holland.
Lasersohn, Paul. 2018. Common Nouns as Variables: Evidence from Conservativity and the
Temperature Paradox. In Robert Truswell, Chris Cummins, Caroline Heycock, Brian
Rabern, and Hannah Rohde (eds.), Proceedings of Sinn und Bedeutung 21, vol. 2
(pp. 731–46).
Levine, Joseph. 1983. Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap. Paciﬁc Philosophical
Quarterly 64:354–61.
Lewis, David. 1983. New Work for a Theory of Universals. Australasian Journal of Philosophy
61 (4):343–77. Reprinted in Lewis (1999: 8–55).
Lewis, David. 1984. Putnam’s Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (3):221–36.
Reprinted in Lewis (1999: 56–77).
Lewis, David. 1991. Parts of Classes. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Lewis, David. 1999. Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press.
Lipton, Peter. 2004. Inference to the Best Explanation, 2nd edn. London: Routledge.
Maddy, Penelopea. 2011. Defending the Axioms: On the Philosophical Foundations of Set
Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Mallon, Ron. 2003. Social Construction, Social Roles, and Stability. Socializing Metaphysics:
The Nature of Social Reality (pp. 327–353). Lanham: Rowman & Littleﬁeld.
Malzbender, J., den Toonder, J.M.J., Balkenende, A.R., de With, and G. 2002. Measuring
Mechanical Properties of Coatings: A Methodology Applied to Nanoparticle-Filled Sol–Gel
Coatings on Glass. Materials Science and Engineering: R: Reports 36 (2):47–103.
Margolis, Eric, and Laurence, Stephen. (eds.) 1999. Concepts: Core Readings. Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press.
Margolis, Eric, and Laurence, Stephen. 2014. Concepts. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Spring. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/12/2019, SPi
  ´ 
Martin, Donald A. 1998. Mathematical Evidence. In H. Garth Dales and Gianluigi Oliveri
(eds.), Truth in Mathematics (pp. 215–231). Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Mayr, Ernst. 1996. What Is a Species, and What Is Not? Philosophy of Science 63 (2):262–77.
Millikan, Ruth Garrett. 1999. Historical Kinds and the “Special Sciences”. Philosophical Studies
95 (1):45–65.
Miyoshi, Kazuhisa. 1999. Aerospace Mechanisms and Tribology Technology: Case Study.
Tribology International 32 (11):673–85.
Montague, Richard. 1973. The Proper Treatment of Quantiﬁcation in Ordinary English. In
Jaakko Hintikka, Julius Moravcsik, and Patrick Suppes (eds.), Approaches to Natural
Language: Proceedings of the 1970 Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics
(pp. 221–242). Dordrecht: Reidel.
Morgan, Thomas H., Sturtevant, Alfred H., Muller, Herman J., Bridges, Calvin B. 1915. The
Mechanism of Mendelian Heredity. New York: Henry Holt.
Newey, Charles, andWeaver, Graham. (eds.) 2013.Materials Principles and Practice: Electronic
Materials Manufacturing with Materials Structural Materials. Amsterdam: Elsevier.
Nolan, Daniel. 1999. Is Fertility Virtuous in its Own Right? British Journal for the Philosophy of
Science 50 (2):265–82.
Oddie, Graham. 2005. Value, Reality, and Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Pérez Carballo, Alejandro. 2016. Structuring Logical Space. Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research. 92 (2):460–91. Early View, 2014.
Pietroski, Paul. 2003. The Character of Natural Language Semantics. In Alex Barber (ed.),
Epistemology of Language (pp. 217–56). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Portmore, Douglas W. 2009. Consequentializing. Philosophy Compass 4 (2):329–47.
Rosen, Gideon. 1994. Objectivity and Modern Idealism: What is the Question? In Michaelis
Michael and John O’Leary-Hawthorne (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
Rosen, Gideon. 2010. Metaphysical Dependence: Grounding and Reduction. In Bob Hale and
Aviv Hoffmann (eds.), Modality: Metaphysics, Logic, and Epistemology. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Rosen, Gideon. 2015. Real Deﬁnition. Analytic Philosophy 56 (3):189–209.
Rudd, R.E., and Broughton, J.Q. 2000. Concurrent Coupling of Length Scales in Solid State
Systems. physica status solidi (b) 217 (1):251–91.
Schaffer, Jonathan. 2004. Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties. Paciﬁc Philosophical Quar-
terly 85 (1):92–102.
Scharp, Kevin. 2013. Replacing Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Schwalbe, Ulrich, and Walker, Paul. 2001. Zermelo and the Early History of Game Theory.
Games and Economic Behavior 34 (1):123–37.
Shelah, Saharon, and Woodin, Hugh. 1990. Large Cardinals Imply that Every Reasonably
Deﬁnable Set of Reals is Lebesgue Measurable. Israel Journal of Mathematics 70 (3):381–94.
Sider, Theodore. 1996. Naturalness and Arbitrariness. Philosophical Studies 81 (2):283–301.
Sider, Theodore. 2013. Writing the Book of the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stalnaker, Robert C. 2002. Epistemic Consequentialism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
Supplementary Volume 76 (1):153–68.
Stanford, P. Kyle. 1995. For Pluralism and against Realism about Species. Philosophy of Science
62 (1):70–91.
Stoljar, Daniel. 2015. Chomsky, London and Lewis. Analysis 75 (1):16–22.
Tappenden, Jamie. 2005. Proof Style and Understanding in Mathematics I: Visualization,
Uniﬁcation and Axiom Choice. In Paolo Mancosu, Klaus Jørgensen, and Stig Pedersen
(eds.), Visualization, Explanation and Reasoning Styles in Mathematics (pp. 147–214).
Dordrecht: Springer.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/12/2019, SPi
 :  
Tappenden, Jamie. 2008a. Mathematical Concepts and Deﬁnitions. In Paolo Mancosu (ed.),
The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (pp. 256–75). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tappenden, Jamie. 2008b. Mathematical Concepts: Fruitfulness and Naturalness. In Paolo
Mancosu (ed.), The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (pp. 276–301). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Taylor, Barry. 1993. On Natural Properties in Metaphysics. Mind 102 (405):81–100.
Thomasson, Amie L. Chapter 21, this volume. A Pragmatic Method for Conceptual Ethics. In
Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen, and David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and
Conceptual Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Varzi, Achille. 2015. Boundary. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Winter. Stanford: Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University.
Walley, Stephen M. 2012. Historical Origins of Indentation Hardness Testing. Materials
Science and Technology 28 (9–10):1028–44.
Welch, P. D. 2015. Large Cardinals, Inner Models, and Determinacy: An Introductory
Overview. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (1):213–42.
White, Roger. 2005. Explanation as a Guide to Induction. Philosopher’s Imprint 5 (2):1–29.
White, Roger. 2007. Does Origins of Life Research Rest on a Mistake? Noûs 41 (3):453–77.
Williamson, Timothy. 2000. Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Wilson, Mark. 1982. Predicate Meets Property. Philosophical Review 91 (4):549–89.
Wilson, Mark. 2006. Wandering Signiﬁcance: An Essay on Conceptual Behavior. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Wilson, Mark. 2008. Beware of the Blob: Cautions for Would-Be Metaphysicians. In Dean
Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 4 (pp. 275–320). Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Wilson, Mark. 2013. What is Classical Mechanics Anyway? In Robert W. Batterman (ed.),
Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Physics (pp. 43–106). Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Wong, Wai-hung, and Yudell, Zanja. 2015. A Normative Account of the Need for Explanation.
Synthese 192 (9):2863–85.
Yalcin, Seth. 2011. Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality. In Andy Egan and Brian Weath-
erson (eds.), Epistemic Modality (pp. 295–334). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zhang, J., Johnston, J., Chattopadhyay, A. 2014. Physics-based Multiscale Damage Criterion
for Fatigue Crack Prediction in Aluminium Alloy. Fatigue and Fracture of Engineering
Materials and Structures 37 (2):119–31.
Zimmerman, Dean. (ed.) 2008. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 4. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 17/12/2019, SPi
  ´ 
